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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Communities have increasingly been internalised as subjects with responsibilities in the 
delivery of urban policy and involvement in broader urban governance.  A prominent example 
is the English New Deal for Communities (NDC) programme that ran between 2001 and 
2012.  Towards the end of government funding, NDCs were required to develop succession 
strategies that would leave a ‘legacy’ for their communities.  This involved the development 
of social enterprise bodies that would continue to support community involvement and 
regeneration efforts through ownership of capital assets, acquisition of public service 
contracts, and partnership working with mainstream service providers.  This paper examines 
the influence of communities on post-NDC bodies, and the relationship between these 
organisations and local government, which was a critical agent in the management of the 
previous NDC bodies.  The ‘recognition’ perspective of Honneth (1995), which is concerned 
with the self-actualisation of actors through inter-subjective relations based on forms of 
recognition (e.g. respect), is deployed in the analysis of post-NDC bodies.  The paper 
concludes that long term community representatives’ have incorporated market values as a 
means in which to acquire ‘respect’ from social enterprise professionals, and that there is a 
lack of recognition by state agents of the role of post-NDC bodies in contemporary urban 
governance. 
 
 
Honneth      Recognition      New Deal for Communities      Communities      Social 
enterprises 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Governmentality and political economy accounts of neoliberalism emphasise the 
responsibilisation of community and voluntary sector bodies in urban policies (Cochrane, 
2007; DeVerteuil, 2015).  Such accounts have not tended to examine the transition from state-
led bodies to post-state funded community-led social enterprises in any great detail, including 
their potential to circumvent or disrupt neoliberal tendencies (see Williams et al, 2014).  New 
Labour’s New Deal for Communities (NDC) programme is one such programme that sought 
to incorporate communities into state-led urban regeneration programmes, and has involved 
transition to independent social enterprises.   
 
The NDC programme ran between 2001 and 2012, involved thirty nine NDC partnerships 
operating in the poorest neighbourhoods in England, with a ten year life and an average 
budget of £50m in which to reduce deprivation.  They were designed to bring communities 
and service providers together within a territorially defined space but forming a ‘scale’ of 
governmental intervention and ‘place’ of communities.  NDCs involved devolved 
responsibility to communities by ensuring they contributed to decision-making, and levering-
in additional funding from the public and private sectors (SEU, 2001).  With the end of Round 
one NDCs in 2011 and Round two in 2012, the parent government department - Department 
for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) - asked all partnerships to develop 
succession strategies to ensure a ‘legacy’ from the programme, but following strict guidance 
in which market-based ‘social enterprise’ entities were to be created to deliver these strategies 
(DCLG, 2008).   
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Resulting post-NDC organisations are charitable trust bodies, possessing one or more 
subsidiary registered companies for trading purposes, producing profits that go into the 
charity, and can broadly be defined as ‘social enterprises’, with revenues funding community 
activities.  Government guidance outlined the activities that could be undertaken by these 
bodies, primarily relating to managing community assets and delivering competitively 
tendered public sector service contracts (DCLG, 2008).  Building upon Clarke (2005), this 
represents neoliberal state ‘abandonment’ to the market, and thus broader networked spatial 
relations, as residents are considered ‘active’ in being able to compete in the market to 
generate profits for community regeneration, with the state believing they have been 
‘empowered’ through the possession of assets and community resources (see DCLG, 2008).   
 
Following Newman (2014), one cannot simply encapsulate this abandonment under a 
universal set of neoliberal and post-crisis austerity processes which are explained through 
macro neoliberal tendencies that produce ‘hybrid’ local arrangement, or the responsibilisation 
of communities through uncontested and homogenous forms of governmentality.  Rather, it is 
a case of critically examining the uneven, incomplete and politicised processes constituting 
community participation in such post-state bodies and their relations with other actors in 
urban governance (see Spears et al, 2009).  This leads to two major issues that are the focus of 
this paper.  First, to what extent are the community representatives of post-NDCs able to 
influence these bodies?  Second, are post-NDC bodies able to influence broader scalar local 
government actors that were the accountable body for NDCs and who impact on their 
territorial areas through public service provision?   
 
Building upon an earlier study of NDCs by Perrons and Sykes (2003) that utilised Fraser’s 
(2000) recognition-redistribution framework, this paper deploys Honneth’s (1995) 
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‘recognition’ approach in understanding community influence.  The approaches of both Fraser 
(2000) and Honneth (1995) examine identity politics and social (in)justice in an age of 
capitalism.  However, while Fraser (2000) advocates the interdependence of (cultural 
intersubjective) recognition and redistribution (unequal capitalist economic relations), 
Honneth (1995) concentrates on recognition, arguing that conflicts over redistribution occur 
through struggles over (mis)recognition based on morality and intersubjective relations.   
 
For Honneth (1995), ‘recognition’ in society is a basis for the ontological self-realisation of 
actors and social justice, with agents making moral claims for recognition as they need to be 
‘recognized in his dignity if he is to maintain a positive relation to himself’ (Deranty and 
Renault, 2007: 97).  Honneth (1995; 2007) identifies three normative elements that are the 
basis of moral identity claims and justice, and through which social injustices are addressed 
by way of struggle.  Firstly, recognition through love and affection which underpins self-
confidence and successful social autonomisation; secondly, through respect in which rights 
are bestowed through legal and moral means; and, finally, recognition of the achievements of 
actors which brings about self-esteem.  When denied, actors struggle for recognition, with 
society viewed as sites of social struggle as groups compete, through different forms of 
recognition, around the value and moral configurations underpinning social institutions, and 
their actual social and cultural ‘worth’ (Kompridis, 2007).   
 
Such an approach brings a more in-depth morality-based analysis of the (spatially orientated) 
intersubjective construction of actors (e.g. identities) and social relations (e.g. how they are 
viewed by others).  One can see in such thinking the role of intersubjective social relations in 
producing space, which is embedded within ‘relational’ concepts of multi-dimensional and 
interrelated spatial relations (Allen and Cochrane, 2014).  Therefore, through this recognition 
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perspective we can problematize the role and influence of community representatives on post-
NDCs and local government.  More broadly, the paper argues that there needs to be greater 
onus on the performative deliberative practices producing (dis)agreement in urban 
governance, rather than simply treating the latter as a hegemonic neoliberal landscape.  This 
requires greater sensitivity towards processes of intersubjective ‘recognition’, as well as the 
(spatially orientated) moral and ethical motives and argumentative critiques/justifications 
deployed in everyday deliberative practices by actors (see Barnett, 2013).   
 
The focus of this study is on an analysis of 20 post-NDC bodies that agreed to be interviewed, 
representing 66.6% of all such organisations as of 2015 and spread across all English regions 
and various urban sites, and a breadth of deprivation levels (see Table 1 and Figure 1).   
 
[FIGURE 1] 
 
In total, 42 interviews were conducted with directors and community representative 
chairpersons, representing two interviews at each post-NDC, which was followed by a further 
round of interviews with local government Board members.  Community chairpersons were 
interviewed because they are the ‘lead’ community representative and typically possess a long 
historical association with their NDCs, as well as being embedded within the micro-politics of 
their local communities.  The paper is therefore focused on the perceptions of these 
individuals, but where such perceptions are triangulated with the opinions of the directors and 
external local government stakeholders.      
 
[TABLE ONE] 
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COMMUNITY ACTORS, THE LOCAL STATE AND RECOGNITION 
  
Community influence, social enterprises and recognition  
Post-NDCs and their predecessor were conceived in an age of neoliberal tendencies, manifest 
in reduced national welfare programmes and greater devolved responsibility to citizens to 
help themselves and their communities (Fuller and Geddes, 2008; Wallace, 2010).  ‘Active 
citizenship’ and entrepreneurship, volunteerism and mutualism with other members of the 
community have all come to prominence, largely as a mechanism in which to justify state 
retrenchment, and embedded within an understanding that citizens fulfil civic ‘duties’ in order 
to be entitled to ‘rights’ (Dargan, 2009; Newman, 2014).  There is a presumption of 
homogeneity, apolitical relations, self-regulation and consensus between community members 
in neoliberal thinking, framing them a cohesive actor in urban governance (Herbert, 2005).  
They are typically viewed as place-specific within the ‘local’, which is regarded as bounded 
and homogenous, and is thus a spatial site where cohesive and efficient social coordination 
can occur, in contrast to a nation state apparatus often defined as bureaucratic and inefficient 
(Clarke and Cochrane, 2013).   
 
Of importance in such processes is the creation of citizen subjectivities based on participation, 
responsibilisation and ‘professionalization’, whereby residents are constituted as bureaucratic 
representatives of their communities (Bondi, 2005).  This community ‘professionalization’ is 
at the heart of these social enterprise bodies, with their development taking place within the 
context of the UK Coalition government’s ‘localism’ rhetoric, in which community bodies 
substitute retrenching state services (Clarke and Cochrane, 2013).  However, they ignore, in 
the same way as the NDC programme did before them, the heterogeneity of communities, and 
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the politics characterising community bodies and their differing geographical relations (see 
DeFilippis, 2008).   
 
With government providing no support to these bodies, there arises the critical issue of 
whether communities are able to influence the running of post-NDCs that are managed by 
social enterprise professionals (more broadly, see Spears et al, 2009).  Relations between 
community representatives and social enterprise officers employed to manage post-NDCs are 
key to such processes.  How their knowledge is valued and the extent to which there is 
institutional continuity in existing participatory arrangements, have been highlighted as 
critical factors for community influence in social enterprises (Eversole, 2011).  In the case of 
the former, expert knowledge, stemming from broader geographical relations, still tends to be 
valued more than communities, which is often viewed as being place-specific (Purcell, 2006).   
 
A critical issue found in many social enterprises is the relationship between market and social 
values, and such issues have the potential to significantly influence and distort the role of 
community representatives (Dart, 2004; Alter, 2006).  For Spears et al (2009), social 
enterprises have to mediate and balance the tension between maintaining revenues through 
competition in the (spatially networked) market, and remaining committed to social objectives 
within the ‘place’ of communities.  Pharoah et al (2004) and Pearce (2006) found that with a 
greater focus on income generation comes less concern with social goals, since generating 
revenues means engaging broader market values.  For Pearce (2006), social enterprise 
professionals are pragmatically supportive of market values, not least because they place 
critical importance on revenues as an ends, rather than as a means.  Such values are often in 
tension with conceptions of community that are based on values and recognition embedded 
within behaviours of civic duty, interdependence and reciprocity (Cornwall, 2008).   
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It is within such a context that community-led social enterprises are the deliberative arenas in 
which community representatives and professionals work through the ‘politics of recognition’ 
(Deranty and Renault, 2007).  Whilst many accounts in this literature have elaborated on the 
complex relations between different constituents (e.g. Wallace, 2010), they tend to focus on 
practices of collaborative governance, rather than seeking to understand the relationship 
between such practices and the causal nature of human actors and their intersubjective 
constitution.  In contrast, a critical form of recognition for Honneth (1995) is the realisation of 
(cultural, political and material) rights and respect through moral means, which fosters the 
self-respect and dignity that is personhood.  Achieving self-respect takes place through the 
self-realisation of a competent moral subject, whereby actors inter-subjectively recognise each 
other through ‘their status as morally responsible’ (Honneth, 1995: 110).   
 
Yet determination of this inter-subjective judgement is indeterminate, and has underpinned 
the greater ‘inclusivity [of more people] and precision [in extending subjects rights]’ (ibid) of 
contemporary law in defining such moral responsibility.  Self-respect and dignity of actors 
has come to be related to their ability to claim rights.  Where other actors accord rights and 
respect, which recognises the moral worth of these subjects, self-respect is produced.  Where 
these are denied, it leads to feelings of disrespect and, ultimately, struggle and resistance 
through claims of moral worth (Honneth, 1995).  Through such a perspective it is possible to 
examine the relationship between community representatives and social enterprise 
professionals in post-NDC bodies, based on forms of ‘recognition’.   
  
Urban governance, communities and recognition 
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Since New Labour efforts have been made to give communities and social enterprises a 
‘voice’ and role in urban governance arenas and service provision, both of which are ‘legacy’ 
tasks of post-NDCs (Haugh and Kitson, 2007; Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008; DCLG, 2008).  
Yet urban governance remains a site of considerable inequalities between community groups 
and state bodies, power relations between different organisations, and with the nation state 
unable to fully control diverse organisations (DeVerteuil, 2015; DeFillippis et al, 2009).  This 
is particularly evident in DeVerteuil’s (2014) argument that many accounts of urban injustice, 
with their focus on ‘punitive’ logics, fail to fully comprehend and elucidate the disparate 
aims, practices, values and identities characterising the voluntary sector (see also DeVerteuil 
and Wilton, 2009).   
  
State restructuring under a regime of neoliberalism, abandonment and recent ‘austerity 
localism’ produces complexities in welfare provision around differing degrees, types and 
speeds of change (see DeVerteuil, 2003), as well as providing routes for communities to 
influence and resist state agendas (Williams et al, 2012).  This has been notable in the 
accounts of subversive actors within and beyond the state through ‘interstitial politics of 
resistance and experimentation’ (Williams et al 2014), social enterprises as a form of 
resilience (Steiner and Atterton 2015), and ‘progressive localism’ (Featherstone et al 2012; 
Morse and Munro, 2015) under a regime of ‘spatial liberalism’ (Clarke and Cochrane, 2013).  
Given that the basis of these accounts is the need to recognise the fractured, assembled and 
performed nature of communities and neoliberal governing arrangements (see Springer, 
2015), then one must seek to understand how such heterogeneity is constructed through 
intersubjective relations, which for Honneth (1995) requires emphasis on a ‘politics of 
recognition’ involving the ethical and moral dimensions of action (see Williams et al, 2014).   
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Conceptualisation of how communities and social enterprises seek to influence state bodies 
through particular geographical relations is critical.  For Staeheli (2013), activists have to 
reconfigure moral obligations and responsibility in seeking to ensure the state fulfils its 
obligations towards civil society.  One significant element is the role of legitimacy in 
providing a moral and ethical basis for an organisation, agreement or action, and subsequently 
underpinning argumentative stances and justifications (Boltanski, 2011).  Legitimacy, as part 
of efforts to convey ‘justice’, is important in understanding the ethical receptiveness of state 
actors to the aims and wishes of communities (Curtis, 2008).  In the social enterprise literature 
the ‘legitimacy’ of an organisation, and ability to influence, is defined as conforming to 
sectoral institutionalised norms of behaviour (Mason et al, 2007; Walker and McCarthy, 
2010).  An alternative is to view legitimacy as performative and intricately related to the 
moral and ethical inter-subjective construction of relations between actors, and the desire for 
recognition (see Fraser, 2000).   
 
For this we turn to Honneth’s (1995; 2007) emphasis on conflict in social life and the role of 
moral identity claims (Barnett, 2013).  Honneth (1995, 2007) argues that recognition of a 
person’s attributes and achievements by a given community builds self-esteem, which is 
‘socially defined worth of their concrete characteristics’ that is not validated in the legal 
system given its abstract and universal nature (121).  Recognition is produced by actors 
achieving tasks better than others.  Actors convey through semantic and discursive means the 
worth of their values and achievements, with the aim of bringing about greater solidarity 
through broader recognition of their worth (Kompridis, 2007).   
 
But the role of politics is paramount, with Deranty and Renault (2007) arguing that Honneth 
(1995) provides a ‘politics of recognition’.  Those actors seeking to dominate can 
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misrecognise as they frame actors in accordance with certain conceptions of worth (Boltanski, 
2011).  Where perceptions of social injustice arises they are based on the perceived 
misrecognition of the affected groups’ sense of self-value and worth, which is embedded 
within particular geographies (e.g. relational global networks encompassing community 
groups contesting global capitalism; see Featherstone, 2008), and thus geographical relations 
are intrinsic to the politics of recognition.  This has been notable in studies of local state-
citizen relations which demonstrate the embeddedness of geographical relations in the politics 
of recognition.  The state constructs the identities, and geographical relations, of communities 
and community representatives that frames their eligibility and role in these broader 
participatory forums (Barnes et al, 2007; Newman et al, 2006).  Citizens have often been 
viewed as lacking the bureaucratic skills and knowledge in which to lead and manage, often 
as they are framed as having knowledge that is confined to the territorialised smaller 
geographical spaces of neighbourhoods (Wallace, 2010).  Civic values of participation in 
governance is thus subordinated to bureaucratic values of efficient service provision through 
the scalar nation state apparatus, resulting in the exclusion of communities (Sullivan et al, 
2006).   
 
The effects of misrecognition are considerable as ‘disesteem’ is produced, manifest in the 
reduced ability of actors and groups to act autonomously and self-realise their causal abilities 
(Honneth, 2007).  This sense of injustice leads to struggle and contestation for recognition 
based on their ‘worth’, something that has been alluded to in various studies of state-citizen 
relations, and involving deliberative argumentation (see, for example, Barnes, 2009).  Taking 
this forward, the deployment of a ‘recognition’-based conceptual framework will examine the 
ability of community-led post-NDCs (which are partly territorialised by way of community 
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participation and assets but work through various relational networks) to influence a broader 
scalar local government.   
 
 
POST-NEW DEAL FOR COMMUNITIES 
 
Post-NDCs and communities 
New Deal for Communities partnerships were firmly rooted within neoliberal tendencies of 
utilising citizen capabilities and expertise in addressing what was considered territorialised 
poverty, viewed under the guise of ‘neighbourhood effects’ (MacLeavy, 2009).  This was to 
take place through activation, empowerment and responsibilisation in programme and service 
design at a defined neighbourhood scale, which typically brought disparate neighbourhoods 
together under the rubric of a ‘community’ (Dinham, 2004).  NDCs were thus sites 
discursively framing communities as subjects of ‘participation’ and community 
‘professionalization’ (Bondi, 2005), with citizens actively enrolled as professional 
representatives for their communities, and taking on bureaucratic responsibilities (Dargan, 
2009).  These are a set of priorities and actual practices that remains important to post-NDCs, 
although the definition of ‘local’ is no longer centrally defined (DCLG, 2008).  As registered 
charities, regulated by the Charities Act (2011), or Community Interest Companies 
(Companies Act 2004), corporate governance arrangements have to adhere to nation state 
legal rules and regulations.  However, actual appointment to post-NDC boards is very much a 
devolved process and, following NDC trends, is highly problematic.  Post-NDCs are 
governed by a board of representatives made up of a majority of community representatives 
elected to these positions, along with one or two local councillors, and non-resident 
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stakeholders that bring particular expertise such as business management but the number of 
representatives are small across all post-NDCs.    
 
Overall changes to the breadth and depth of community involvement in post-NDCs has not 
occurred, with a continuing decline in involvement across all organisations, irrespective of 
geographical location (Lawless and Pearson, 2012).  Only nine post-NDCs have community 
representatives that have been elected to resident associations (although only one post-NDC 
uses the Electoral Commission), who are then nominated to serve on the post-NDC board by 
the association’s governing committee, of which they are a member.  In the other cases they 
are simply appointed to the board with agreement of all members, and in both routes there are 
no discernible spatial trends across England between north and south, or urban size, 
suggesting a critical role for the individual institutional contingencies of NDCs.   
 
Post-NDC officers and board members justify these approaches by way of business efficiency 
and a lack resources in which to maintain previous levels of participation and accountability, 
and with legitimacy bestowed on these place-based residents association, although interviews 
suggest that post-NDCs have little knowledge or care for the democratic robustness and 
accountability of such bodies.  In this sense the market directly intrudes on community 
accountability as participation is defined in terms of commercial costs and revenues, with 
‘rights’ coming about through the emphasis placed on commercial profits as the dominant 
form of worth.  One particular example is that of Bridge Renewal Trust in Haringey, North 
London, where posts are advertised through a community newsletter and then the board 
selects candidates based on an interview process, with the approach justified on the basis of 
business efficiency, namely around the costs of such activities.   
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The danger with such arrangements is that the board has the ability to select what they 
perceive as suitable representatives, but often strongly guided by the directors, perpetuating 
already biased forms of representation and rights towards particular groups.  This represents a 
degree of continuity with NDCs as community ‘professionalization’ was severely mediated 
by the level of influence communities had on NDC bodies, as well as the variation of access 
and influence between different groups, all of which lived through differing geographical 
relations (Beebeejaun and Grimshaw, 2011).  In the case of Newham New Deal Partnership, 
in East London, the Director notes that the broader representativeness of community 
representatives is uncertain, because they are there for possible reasons other than 
representing the broader community (Post-NDC Director interview).  By relying upon the 
perceived democratic legitimacy of resident’s association or direct appointments to boards 
from residents living in the original NDC area, post-NDC bodies follow previous New Labour 
thinking in terms of defining communities as homogenous and without conflict and power 
relations between social groups (see Mathers et al, 2008).  Yet there is a heavy reliance on 
community activists that have long been involved in NDCs and other local community 
activities in all post-NDCs, irrespective of their geographical location, some considered to be 
working for altruistic principles, many others in relation to their own community group 
interests (anonymised Post-NDC Director interview).  As one local government representative 
notes of the ‘North Earlham, Larkman and Marlpit Development Trust’ in Norwich: 
 
“I think you do kind of see a churn of individuals and they tend to be the 
same individuals from the same groups with the same interest.  Even of the 
same demographic, you know, you can see that there are quite a few elderly 
females on the Board, who will be those individuals who’ve been in the 
community for a long, long time; but when one moves on it may be that a 
friend of hers may be invited on the Board from the area.” (Local 
government representative interview) 
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Certain local government representatives, spread throughout all regions, are sceptical of 
community participation, viewing dependence on long term community representatives as 
biased recognition of their importance as representatives of the community, which hinders 
broadening-out of community participation (anonymised Local government representative 
interviews).  In this sense the politics of recognition is embedded within geographical 
relations between scalar but relationally networked local government actors, defining 
legitimacy in terms of local democracy; and community representatives who deem their 
legitimacy in terms of long term place-specific relations with residents.   
 
The recognition by community representatives of their worth produces a ‘self-respect’ which 
in itself further increases self-perception of their importance to communities, and ability to 
perceive the wishes of the community.  As one community representative at Preston Road 
Neighbourhood Development Company in Hull, in the north of England, notes:  
 
“We are the ones that have been around for years, we knew how to run the 
NDC, how the Council thinks, and what our community wants.  That makes 
us the ideal people to take forward the Trust…. This has been appreciated by 
the new manager and the community in our resident association, with no one 
coming forward to contest my appointment.” (Community representative 
interview). 
 
Post-NDC directors and local government representatives, across all regions, typically frame 
community representatives as remaining influenced by the types of parochial actions 
witnessed in NDC bodies.  One local government representative describes a situation where 
“residents have a very narrow viewpoint.  They are just looking at ‘what do I get’?  Even 
when we were looking at priorities for areas, it was why should they get that before we do” 
(anonymised local government representative).  An (anonymised) post-NDC Director, in 
control of a large neighbourhood centre, recites incidents where:  
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“There are times when a decision made by the residents association is a 
conflict of interest with the powers of the organisation…..it was done as I say 
in the best interests of the community they would argue, but only their 
community group.  I think that kind of unprofessionalism runs through 
communities at times.  Because they’re not professional and because this issue 
of conflict of interest is something they just don’t often grasp.”  (Post-NDC 
director interview) 
 
Community representatives believe such views of unprofessionalism represent misrecognition 
by a local government actor situated beyond their neighbourhoods, designating them with 
moral ambiguity for favouring particular sections of the community.  They argue that this is 
deployed by directors and local government board members to “restrict the say of 
communities in how the organisation is run”, and that it is the social enterprise professionals 
that lack knowledge of the circumstances and desires, and thus spatial relational networks of 
the diverse communities that community representatives have to represent (anonymised 
community representative interview).  This represents enduring biased social relations as 
NDCs which were often dominated by officers, particularly where there was a lack of breadth 
and depth to community participation, and typically involved officers framing the (spatial) 
subjectivities of these communities and their role in the organisations (MacLeavy, 2009).  In 
such processes there was misrecognition of the worth of these citizens, on the basis of what 
they are able to contribute in achieving the NDCs’ aims (Perrons and Sykes, 2003).   
 
Many post-NDCs, across all regions and various urban sites, seek to produce a certain form of 
legitimacy amongst the community which involves the construction of particular networked 
spatial relations.  As one representative from the Coventry post-NDC body (Moathouse Trust) 
notes:  
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“We’re very conscious as a Trust that we need to be seen to do things for this 
community, and I’m not sure the NDC ever fully grasped that, but if we don’t do 
things for the community people will wonder what we do, and the tendency is to 
think it just does stuff for itself.” (Post-NDC Director interview) 
 
Such forms of legitimacy are based on the perception of an action- and outcome- orientated 
body, which officers believe the community would judge worthwhile, thus acquiring respect.  
This does have implications for the relationship with communities, as most post-NDCs seek 
to focus on outcomes, rather than a breadth of participation through in-depth consultation and 
involvement mechanisms.  For many post-NDCs, across various urban sites,  this has justified 
a stance towards maintaining strong representation through long term community 
representatives, thus demonstrating a continuity with NDC spatial relations, which accords 
respect towards these residents as a means in which to be action-orientated and achieve wider 
community legitimacy.  Possibilities for broader community involvement are curtailed, and 
the development of recognition and self-respect is itself limited to particular individuals.  As 
one councillor at the Greets Green Community Enterprise (GGCE), situated in Sandwell 
(West Midlands), notes:   
 
“Greets Green Trust relies heavily on a few residents, meaning that many others 
don’t realise that they can get involved…this isn’t very empowering for them, 
you’re talking about people that are severely lacking in confidence…. but they 
won’t get any help from the new bodies.” (Local government representative 
interview).    
 
Post-NDC social enterprise professionals generally find they are managing resident 
expectations and addressing “unrealistic aims and financial expectations” in their succession 
strategies, which further hinders their respect towards community representatives, and the 
allocation of rights in managing the organisation (anonymised Post-NDC Director interview).  
This typically involves territorialised commercial capital assets such as neighbourhood 
centres and commercial premises, common to the majority of post-NDCs, which have 
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struggled to attract and retain tenants in the marketplace, with only five post-NDCs making a 
net profit in 2014-15 (see Table 2).   
 
[TABLE 2] 
 
Many directors note that a lot of effort went into the bureaucratic “detail” of succession 
strategies in order to get these approved by the lead Government department (DCLG) and 
local government as the accountable body, but “nobody seemed to stand back from it far 
enough, and say, hang about, does this make sense?” in terms of the market (anonymised 
Post-NDC director interview).  The Director of Greets Green Community Enterprises 
(Sandwell, West Midlands) highlights the example of a succession project involving the 
recycling of computers which was viable, but residents desired a project that would bring in 
greater funding, with external consultants suggesting the recycling of monitors and TV.  For 
the Director this added a great deal of complexity to the project, involving costly machinery, 
which is “an enormous stretch for what is basically a charity”, but which was “overlooked” by 
relevant NDC professionals and residents that did not have the commercial skills to 
comprehend these challenges (Post-NDC Director interview).   
 
The production of particular forms of self-realisation and inter-subjective (mis)recognition 
must be understood as constantly produced (Kompridis, 2007).  In the case of post-NDC 
Board members, all directors take the view that citizens have to go through what is termed a 
‘transition period’ (Post-NDC Director interview).  Directors judge the role of community 
representatives in NDCs as having been to agree allocations of large amounts of money and 
ensure that all the budget was spent, otherwise it would be returned to central government, 
thereby representing the importance of bureaucratic scalar relations.  This is a subjectivity that 
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is now incongruent with what is judged worthy by all social enterprise professionals and local 
government councillors when running a commercial entity, which they argue requires a 
“business acumen” to deliver business plans that identify and exploit market gaps 
(anonymised Post-NDC Director interview).  As the post-NDC director of Centre West 
(Newcastle) argues:  
 
 “What we lack is people with business acumen, and we could probably do 
with some kind of professional input, like we could benefit from maybe legal 
acumen, marketing acumen….areas like that where we are a little bit weak.” 
(Post-NDC Director interview) 
 
Yet the nation state provided no support or training for community representatives as NDCs 
transferred to market-based post-NDCs.  For many community representatives it was a case of 
central government mistakenly believing this would be a natural transition, without the need 
for state support.  In the absence of any support through this state ‘abandonment’, community 
representatives believe they have subsequently struggled to acquire the ‘respect’ they would 
desire from officers and local government stakeholders.   
 
It is important to recognise the intricacies of this politics of recognition, whereby disrespect of 
social enterprise professionals by community representatives leads to counter forms of 
disrespect by the former.  Post-NDCs typically lack financial resources in which to employ a 
large team of professionals, with community representatives possessing a “lack faith in the 
team that they’re left with in terms of skills and experience” because of their small size.  This 
is then typically cited by many as a reason why the organisation is not generating sufficient 
revenues in which to reinvest in the community (anonymised community representative 
interviews).  The response to such forms of recognition by professionals has been to frame the 
situation in terms of struggling to address “unrealistic” commercial aims that were approved 
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by communities in the succession strategies; as the director of Greets Green Community 
Enterprise (Sandwell, West Midlands) argues: 
 
“The breadth of the New Deal activities created some unrealistic expectations 
in the population, because talking to our Chair, he admits that people just 
came expecting everything to be free.  You keep telling them, well, the 
partnership’s over, those days are gone, there’s still people saying ‘why can’t 
you do some of what they did?’  Well, very, very limited given that we have 
to try and generate funds, and the [NDC] partnership had roughly £5 million a 
year to spend.  We’re into sort of handfuls of thousands and they were into 
millions.  So, getting a realistic expectation of what could happen is difficult.”   
(Post-NDC Director interview).    
 
It is therefore the case that misrecognition by professionals is constructed through their belief 
that residents have insufficient understanding of a marketplace that is imbricated in relational 
spatial networks working within, through and beyond post-NDC localities.  As with the NDC 
programme, this represents the continuing effort of professional officers and the nation state 
to construct the subjectivities of communities, ensuring they are congruent with NDC legacy 
priorities rather than the desires of local communities (see Mathers et al, 2008).  Here we see 
the darker side of professionalization occurring as residents are internalised within state 
priorities, with misrecognition of their role distorting the original NDC programme intentions 
of community leadership (Wallace, 2010), and is particularly notable in the relationship 
between market and community values in post-NDCs.  
 
Market versus community values 
A critical element of the influence of communities on post-NDC bodies is the mediation of 
social priorities, relationally produced and constituting the ‘place’ of post-NDCs, and market 
values that operate through much broader spatial relational networks, and which relate to 
post-NDCs being run as organisations competing in the market to generate revenues.  An 
overarching factor for many post-NDCs has been the introduction of professional social 
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enterprise officers, replacing regeneration-based officers that left at the end of the NDC 
programme, and who are generally framed as “bureaucratically orientated career civil 
servants” (anonymised local government representative interview).  All post-NDC directors 
have backgrounds in working for social enterprises and frame their role in terms of, first and 
foremost, maintaining commercial viability and, secondly, being accountable to residents.  As 
the director of Bridge Renewal Trust, in North London, argues:  
 
“We are focused on running it as a business, as a social business.  And making 
sure that it's sustainable.  And I think the accountability element of it, yes we still 
need to make sure that we… maintain the channel of communication with 
residents and so forth, but we take the view that if we don't run as a business then 
we will not be here long.” (Post-NDC Director interview) 
 
In general, the approach to sustainability relies upon having an income stream from various 
territorialised capital assets, principally relating to purchased industrial, office and shop 
accommodation (see Table 2).  This also includes multi-function neighbourhood centres, 
incorporating different services (e.g. doctors’ surgeries) that were built by seven NDCs across 
all regions and different urban sites (see Table 2).  Such capital assets have not provided large 
turnovers because of their considerable overheads, including building maintenance, with non-
community representatives often stating that buildings such as neighbourhood centres are as 
much a liability as an asset (anonymised community representative interview) (see Table 2).  
As one community representative notes with regards a large neighbourhood/sports centre in 
Coventry, built by the Moathouse Trust post-NDC body:  
 
“This building was built because the community wanted it built, and it was 
always considered to be something that the community should own and control, 
but if you look at it there’s a lot of offices in it, and there’s a sports centre, and 
the sports centre will never make any money, it’s a cost.  So, there’s always a 
question whether this building was an asset or a liability.” (Community 
representative interview).   
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Yet while community representatives had a degree of influence during the NDC programme, 
through the construction of ‘place’ by government, there is evidence that market values, as 
conveyed by social enterprise professionals, now influence their attitudes and beliefs.  With 
high operating costs, maintaining income levels have become paramount, and as noted by the 
chair of Preston Road Neighbourhood Development Company in Hull, this need to “cover the 
costs of this large building” has grown in importance. This has become particularly important 
as many post-NDC reserves started to diminish to cover costs during the recent recession.  
Across all post-NDCs we see a change in the perceptions of community representative 
towards the purpose of the organisation, representing the incorporation of spatially networked 
market values given the need to ensure a revenue stream, and the desire for forms of 
recognition that are expected of them by managers, and is thus congruent with community 
professionalisation and institutionalisation (Bondi, 2005).  This is particularly evident at 
Greets Green Community Enterprise (Sandwell, West Midlands) where the community 
representatives epitomises the onus on financial stability first and foremost, and thus 
reconfiguration of the politics of recognition towards the broader relational spaces of markets:  
 
“So, I’m all in favour of having some ambitious goals there, but they do have 
to be tempered by the realism that we can afford to do very little until we have 
stabilised the finances. Once that’s happened you can start putting things back 
and then the real question is, okay, the core cost here is as low as it’s possible 
to get them therefore we can say to any other partners that extra income will 
now go on delivery of projects and objectives people want to pick out.” 
(Community representative interview) 
 
Residents generally place a higher premium on reserves, and thus the long term survival of 
post-NDCs, rather than spending on place-based community projects without a clear financial 
and commercial rationale.  For example, just after succession at Moathouse Trust, the post-
NDC in Coventry (West Midlands), a non-resident representative produced guidance for the 
establishment of a ‘committee chest’ for dispersing funds to community/voluntary groups 
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situated within the previous NDC boundaries.  However, community board members did not 
endorse the fund because they believe some of the requests “would not be valid… not 
justified” (local government representative interview).  The Board started to judge proposals 
in terms of the financial rewards of supporting such activities, which can be measured in 
quantitative terms of financial benefits, rather than more intangible benefits from community 
activities (Community representative interview).   
 
The transfer from large scale NDCs to much smaller post-NDC bodies has also involved 
substantial organisational downsizing, most important of which has been the significant 
reduction in the number of full time equivalent and part time employees to 9.85, although 
there are significant divergences, and with some of the largest located in the northeast and 
Yorkshire (Table 2).  Qualitative data indicates however the heavy reliance on part time 
employees and those funded by specific short term projects (NDC director interviews).  Yet 
such downsizing has been uncontested and has even become a virtue to be celebrated, as one 
community representative notes: “it was the best thing for the Trust, because the Trust had to 
downsize its ambition really” (anonymised community representative interview).  What we 
see is a reconfiguration of the attitudes of community representatives, with post-NDC 
directors having a critical role in such processes, and involving a “great deal of time talking 
openly with residents about the need to be small because the income isn’t great and the 
reserves are small” (anonymised Post-NDC Director interview).  Frugality has thus become a 
moral worth for community representatives across all post-NDCs as they seek to be portrayed 
as morally responsible, coming about through their dialogue with directors as they seek “to do 
what’s best for the Trust” (anonymised community representative interview).     
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Post-NDCs and community influence on mainstream service providers  
A key element of the intended legacy of NDCs was for post-NDCs to be able to influence 
service providers, operating through broader relational networks and governing scales, which 
impact strongly on their communities and areas (DCLG, 2008).  In contrast to ‘progressive 
localism’, communities involved in the NDC programme lacked influence on state actors 
working to disparate central government aims and spatial scales (MacLeavy, 2009).  Local 
Government, as the accountable body for NDCs and providers of administrative support, was 
accused of possessing knowledge of the bureaucratic scalar governing procedures in which 
partnerships operated, with communities lacking such knowledge and the resources to 
influence these arrangements (Fuller and Geddes, 2008;  Mathers et al, 2008; Beatty, 2010).  
This conforms to broader trends in which communities have often been unequal partners in 
area-based initiatives and pre-established scalar participatory governance (Hastings et al, 
1996; Purcell, 2006).  
 
Such trends have continued with post-NDC bodies as the level of interest by local government 
has diminished considerably across all post-NDCs, leaving them to struggle with influencing 
the agendas of these agents.  Misrecognition of the achievements and worth of NDCs has 
contributed to disesteem for post-NDCs and communities, including the contribution of the 
NDC to regenerating their areas.  In contrast to the evidence presented by the National 
Evaluation of NDCs (DCLG, 2010), many local government representatives (across all 
English regions and urban sites) believe that the NDC had limited impact on their areas, with 
respondents highlighting the inconsistent improvements demonstrated in the Government’s 
‘Indices of multiple deprivation’ index (see also Fuller and Geddes, 2008; MacLeavy, 2009; 
Wallace, 2015).  A key practice of such misrecognition is comparison with non-NDC places 
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in the same city or town, as demonstrated in the statement of the local government 
representative for the ‘North Earlham, Larkman and Marlpit Development Trust’ in Norwich: 
 
“Let’s have a look…I’d put down little impact, probably, that’s what I would 
say, on the basis of what…?  Let’s look at the hard facts…if you compare this 
area with any other area in Norwich, there’s no difference, but they’ve had 40 
million quid spent on it, that’s the only change, so, therefore, you have to say 
to yourself, well, where as 40 million quid gone?  And I can’t tell you, because 
I don’t know where it’s gone!  I can’t tell!” (Local government representative 
interview)  
 
The national austerity programme of budget cuts since 2010 has meant that many state 
agencies are preoccupied with service cuts, involving the reconfiguration and retrenchment of 
their relational spatial networks, rather than engaging community bodies as part of 
outsourcing programmes (Jones et al, 2015).  As the Director of ‘Back on the Map’ (in 
Sunderland northeast England) states: “because all of our service-provider partners have been 
subjected to either cuts in resources or radical restructurings, they’ve got a lot to distract them 
from continuing their relationship with us”.  Even in London where the four participant post-
NDCs have acquired service contracts, many directors note that the outsourcing of services is 
being met with resistance from local government: “It’s not in an officer’s interests to be 
giving services away and contracting out, and I’d say there is a culture of protectionism” 
(anonymised post-NDC Director interview).   
 
The opportunities for acquiring contracts in this environment has not been significant, as one 
director notes: “We’ve tried to say to them, ‘Look, there may be different ways of working – 
we can work with you.’  It hasn’t quite worked yet” (anonymised post-NDC Director 
interview).  In such situations we can see local government’s conceptions of worth embedded 
within a ‘civic’ value system (Boltanski and Thevenot, 2006), where it considers itself the 
democratically accountable community leader in their areas, providing services at the same 
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time as guiding the strategic priorities of other state and non-state bodies through various 
relational networks (Fyfe, 2005).  Post-NDC bodies have struggled in this landscape to be 
recognised as community leaders and service providers, despite the broader rhetoric towards 
‘localism’, producing forms of disesteem where they have not sought to significantly 
challenge local government’s recognition of their role.   
 
This is not to suggest there are no opportunities in the future.  Post-NDC organisations, such 
as ‘West Middlesbrough Neighbourhood Trust’ in northeast England, note that the Council is 
more willing to work with the third sector as they seek to outsource services.  One local 
government representative suggests that discussions are occurring as the Council downsizes 
and wants to outsource “problematic services such as neighbourhood wardens” (anonymised 
local government representative interview).  Many post-NDC bodies have experienced such 
discussions across various English regions and urban sites, which are considered to be 
characteristic of the nature of the ‘permanent austerity’ debate, with a greater role for social 
enterprises in public service provision as they have lower overhead costs, but where the actual 
contracts are not necessarily conducive to their organisational strategies, skills and resources 
(Coote, 2011).  As one (anonymised) post-NDC director argues:  
 
“If they think we’re going to fall over ourselves, and go, whoopee, it’s something 
for us to do, and we may well turn around, and say, actually, you’re not giving us 
a viable service.  You’re trying to unload a problem, and there might well be a 
difference between members and officers on that, because officers know damn 
well what they’re doing, members may not.” (Post-NDC Director interview)   
 
In such processes there is misrecognition taking place as social enterprises are framed, and 
thus ‘recognised’, in terms of monetary cost reduction, involving spatial relational networks 
configured around the local government political scale.  This is in contrast to post-NDCs 
wishing to be viewed as empowering communities by seeking to influence, by way of 
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relational networks, public service actors operating at broader administrative scales, with the 
aim of addressing issues deemed relevant in these previous NDC spaces.  As the director of 
Greets Green Community Enterprises (Sandwell, West Midlands) notes: “there is the danger 
that we are seen as a way of offloading their responsibilities but don’t get acknowledged as 
important to the community… we are just the cheap contractor” (Post-NDC director 
interview).   
 
Processes of misrecognition, in which post-NDCs are judged unworthy in relation to local 
government conceptions of service quality and community well-being, have further 
compounded the perceptions of misrecognition and disesteem of professionals and 
community representatives at post-NDCs.  We can also see this in the service contracts 
acquired by a few post-NDCs, spread throughout the English regions (see Table 2), which 
have been subject to austerity measures.  These contracts have been renegotiated and reduced 
in size, but with local authorities keeping output targets at “very demanding levels” (Post-
NDC Director interview).  Local authorities seeking to benefit from these contract changes do 
so because they view post-NDCs as a contract delivery body, which can be subject to 
commercial aims (embedded within market values) around cost reduction, rather than being 
recognised as a community body working to benefit communities through the reinvestment of 
revenue surplus.  As one (anonymised) London post-NDC director notes:   
 
“If the local authority gives you a contract, they talk about negotiations but there 
is no such thing.  What they are trying to do on this contract is, having said to me, 
‘Obviously this is your money.  You need to spend it as you wish’, I was then 
told I had to take out a lease in another building for £5,000.  I said, ‘That’s more 
than I pay for my whole office space in my own building.’  I said, ‘I won’t do it.’  
They said, ‘You will do it.” (Post-NDC director interview) 
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We also see such dynamics taking place in post-NDCs that possess neighbourhood centres 
where there is a return, as stating by a community representative at Moathouse Trust 
(Coventry, West Midlands), to the “paternalistic attitudes of local government” (community 
representative interview).  In the case of this post-NDC neighbourhood centre, the local 
authority, which has responsibility for the liabilities of the centre, has “reverted back to being 
property managers” in negotiations concerning the future of the building (community 
representative interview).  Council officers view the neighbourhood centre in terms of 
monetary value, rather than as a community asset that is to be owned and run for the benefit 
of the community.  As the community representative notes: 
 
“We found ourselves rehearsing some of those discussions, which really you 
shouldn’t have to do, in the context with succession strategy, which was really all 
about the Council justifying what it was going to do post NDC to sustain the 
investment that had been made over a ten year period.” (Moathouse Trust 
Community representative).   
 
Beyond these issues, the vast majority of post-NDC bodies across all regions and urban sites 
indicate they are no longer the main ‘nexus’ agents of community engagement between state 
agents and local communities constituting the previous NDC area, displacing the recognition 
of NDC achievements in this area (see DCLG, 2010).  For instance, Centre West in Newcastle 
(northeast England) established an extensive set of mechanisms for engaging communities, 
which was formally recognised by the (national) Audit Commission as representing good 
practice for the City Council.  The succession strategy “offered” these arrangements to the 
Council as part of their “holistic” regeneration efforts, but “the city ignored that advice from 
the Audit Commission and decided to set up its own officer-dominated duplicate governance 
structures”, involving far less accountability and input from residents in steering groups (Post-
NDC Director interview).  The reasons for this approach centred on not wanting “a model like 
ours where residents were actually in a majority and making decisions about resources, that 
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was obviously too radical for them at the time” (Post-NDC Director interview).  The response 
by the post-NDC has been to keep lobbying these state bodies on their achievements in 
engaging and representing communities, as well as citing how there is a “legitimate” role for 
the post-NDC in being a mechanism in which: “our residents are really keen to hold service 
providers to account…. that they are continuing to focus in the area to continue the work that 
we started” (Post-NDC Director interview). 
 
Finally, it is important to note that recognition of their achievements and worth by local 
government is possible for post-NDC bodies.  In areas such as Bristol the succession strategy 
of Easton and Lawrence Hill Neighbourhood Management organisation is based on a 
deliberative neighbourhood management approach, focused on “influencing decisions, having 
an overview, bringing partners together, deliberately not being a service provider, so not 
being a competitor with the community and voluntary sector” (Post-NDC Director interview).  
This involved engaging and developing the capacity of communities, deriving from and 
reinforcing the previous-NDC construction of ‘the community’, to convey their wishes to 
local government.  This constructs relational networks and ‘centres’ all efforts towards moral 
‘recognition’ of the post-NDC body and the community as “entitled to have a voice” (Post-
NDC Director interview).  Efforts have included working in what the post-NDC director notes 
is a “negatively branded” area called Stapleton Road.  This particular space has been subject 
to stigmatisation by the local media for its high crime rate and negative perception of the local 
community, including dependence on the welfare state, which has a detrimental impact on the 
esteem of residents (Community representative interview).  The post-NDC has worked with 
residents to “give them voice, to get things done”, help them understand Council decision-
making, and bring them together with the local authority which many residents distrust (Post-
NDC Director interview).   
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Importantly, this example demonstrates the critical bi-lateral nature of ‘recognition’ with the 
success of the efforts of Easton and Lawrence Hill Neighbourhood Management organisation 
contingent on the attitude and responsiveness of Bristol City Council.  The Council views the 
worth of the post-NDC in terms of its democratic legitimacy as a place-specific community 
body, and in such processes we see the generation of esteem as “more locals have the 
confidence to get involved, feel like they are being listened to once again” (Post-NDC 
Director interview).  However, such processes are yet to occur at the vast majority of post-
NDCs, spread across all regions and urban sites, with many suggesting that the disesteem 
arising from the tendencies outlined above has resulted in these bodies becoming more 
inward-looking, concerned with managing territorialised assets, rather than seeking to work 
through broader governance involving relational networks that stretch beyond their areas.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has examined the role of community social enterprise bodies in a post-nation state 
funding landscape of ‘abandonment’.  Through the utilisation of Honneth’s (1995) 
‘recognition’ approach we can conceptualise community representatives in terms of efforts to 
acquire ‘respect’ from the social enterprise professionals employed to manage post-NDCs.  
They are being driven by market principles with self-actualisation based on respect and 
esteem relating to conceptions of worth embedded within market values, rather than 
foregrounding social priorities.  Post-NDCs also seek to influence local government within 
their localities, but have not acquired the forms of recognition they would desire from these 
agencies, who have not designated considerable worth to their past NDC achievements.   
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Given such misrecognition, post-NDCs have retreated back to the political and socially 
constructed relational networks of the ‘place’ of NDCs.  This occurs through a focus on 
individual capital assets, and to the topological relations of the market via the management of 
these assets, rather than extensive participation in the disparate spatial relations of wider 
urban governance.  This has broader implications for the geographical understanding of post-
state funded community organisations.  It is clear that such community bodies are nexus sites 
mediating spatially networked market values and processes, and a set of place-specific 
relational networks encompassing local residents.  This follows Newman’s (2014) argument 
that it is important to move towards more nuanced accounts of the complexities, limitations 
and fragilities of neoliberal tendencies, including the role of alternatives and their 
performativity.  Indeed, this suggests the need for far greater analysis of residual and partly 
marginalised meso-institutional actors, such as the voluntary sector, in the dynamic relations 
between state, society and market in urban governance.      
 
More broadly, the politics and practices of ‘abandonment’ in an age of ‘spatial liberalism’ 
reflects state retrenchment, with an onus on (spatially uneven) ‘local’ rational and responsible 
actors in addressing place-specific priorities around deprivation and economic growth (see 
Clarke and Cochrane, 2013).  Without nation state control and no specific national standards, 
such abandonment presents the possibility for community social enterprises to contest, distort 
and circumvent neoliberal ideologies, institutions and policies.  Nonetheless, evidence from 
this study suggests that such processes are yet to occur, with abandoned community 
representatives engaging market values so as to survive and influence the running of these 
bodies.  Fewer national interventions and standards also offers the potential for greater spatial 
differentiation in terms of the ability of post-NDCs to achieve their priorities, further 
 33 
contributing to uneven institutional arrangements and disparate progress towards reducing 
deprivation.  Whilst local government and those non-state actors embedded in Government 
policy (e.g. national charities delivering local services) have the ability to influence and be 
supported, post-NDCs are beyond the ‘gaze’ of the nation state, meaning that this is truly 
abandonment to the market.   
 
Finally, from the experience of post-NDCs it is clear that the politics and power relations of 
state ‘abandonment’ means that analysis of the deliberative practices underpinning 
‘(dis)agreement’ is critical in urban governance.  While Honneth’s (1995) approach goes 
some way to explaining how actors work towards social justice, the scope for explaining how 
shared public concerns are mobilised and agreement develops, is less evident (see Boltanski 
and Thevenot, 2006).  For Barnett (2013) one way of taking this forward is a ‘plural 
geographies of worth’ approach that builds upon Boltanski and Thevenot’s (2006) sociology 
of critique perspective, and which can transcend insular Anglo-Saxon centric approaches that 
we often find in the analysis of neoliberal relations between state, market and society.   
 
The concept of ‘plural geographies of worth’ is understood as the ‘coordination of actions in 
time and space was understood to operate through the negotiation between multiple practices 
of evaluation, justification and accountability’ (Barnett, 2013: 156).  The approach requires 
far greater sensitivity towards, first, the actual (spatially orientated) argumentative logics 
deployed by actors as they critique and justify their values and worth, which are based on 
particular societal conceptions of common good (e.g. civic values around fostering social 
equalities); and, second, how they interact with the critiques, justifications and thus 
conceptions of worth projected by other actors in subsequent deliberations (see Fuller, 2014).  
Through such an approach it is possible to critically examine the (spatially orientated) ethical 
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and moral motives underpinning the practices of actors and, thus, the constitution and 
performativity of everyday political deliberations, and how these connect with broader ethical 
and moral conceptions through particular geographical relations.  Ultimately, this facilitates 
greater in-depth examination of the mechanics, complexities, incompleteness and 
contradictions of contemporary urban governance, rather than treating these as simply 
hegemonic neoliberal landscapes.  
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Figure 1: Participating post-NDCs 
 
 
Table 1: Location and deprivation levels of participant Post-NDCs 
 
Region  City/Town Urban site Indices of Deprivation 
Ranking (2015)1 
Ranking as a % most 
deprived of all SOAS areas  
Northeast 
 
West Middlesbrough Neighbourhood Trust Middlesbrough Inner city 784 10% most deprived 
Centre West Newcastle  Inner city 297 10% most deprived 
Back on the Map Sunderland Outer city 1175 10% most deprived 
Yorkshire 
 
Bradford Trident Bradford Inner city 680 10% most deprived 
Doncaster Community Development Trust  Doncaster Inner town 1313 10% most deprived 
Preston Road Neighbourhood Development Company Hull Outer city 12 10% most deprived 
Northwest North Huyton Communities Future Knowlsey Outer town 69 10% most deprived 
West Midlands 
 
Greets Green Community Enterprises Sandwell Inner town 3356 20% most deprived 
Moat House Community Trust Coventry  Outer city 653 10% most deprived 
New Horizons Walsall Outer town 3234 20% most deprived 
East Anglia NELM Development Trust Norwich  Outer city 3871 20% most deprived 
Southeast 
 
East Brighton Trust Brighton Inner city 1496 10% most deprived 
Marsh Farm Futures Luton Outer town 871 10% most deprived 
Plus You Ltd Southampton Outer city 3492 20% most deprived 
Southwest 
 
Easton and Lawrence Hill Neighbourhood 
Management 
Bristol  Inner city 9296 30% most deprived 
Devonport Regeneration Community Partnership Plymouth Outer city 7981 30% most deprived 
London 
 
Newham NDP Newham  Inner city 10589 40% most deprived 
Creation Trust Aylesbury Inner city 4496 20% most deprived 
Bridge Renewal Trust Haringey Inner city 6210 20% most deprived 
The New Cross Gate Trust Lewisham Inner city 6232 20% most deprived 
 
1 The IMD ranking is based on the calculation of multiple deprivation indicators for Super Output Areas (SOAs) which correspond to populations of approximately 1,500 residents or 650 households 
(32,844 in total for England). Income, unemployment, crime, health barriers to housing and services, and living environment. The ranking included is based on the postcode of the post-NDC body.  
 
Source: DCLG (2015) 
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Table 2: Employment and financial legacy attributes of post-NDCs 
 
Region  No. of FTE/ PT 
employees 
Annual gross 
income (2014-15)  
Annual expenses 
(2014-15) 
Strategic focus1 Assets 
Northeast 
 
West Middlesbrough Neighbourhood Trust 33 897,613 1,278,220 Capital assets; Service provision Commercial property 
Centre West 14 732,295 733,966 Capital assets Commercial property 
Back on the Map 4 489,725 311,283 Capital assets Community centre, housing 
Yorkshire Bradford Trident 32 1,431,666 1,544,022 Capital assets; Service provision Neighbourhood centre 
Doncaster Community Development Trust  0 No income 
7,096,241 (assets) 
1,849,780 
(depreciation) 
Capital assets Neighbourhood centre 
Commercial property 
Preston Road Neighbourhood Development Co. 24 810,050 1,280,252 Capital assets Neighbourhood centre 
Commercial property 
Northwest North Huyton Communities Future 4 174,529 469,294 Capital assets; Neighbourhood governance; 
Service provision 
Community centres 
West 
Midlands 
 
Greets Green Community Enterprises 7 273,656 131,015 Capital assets Commercial property 
Moat House Community Trust 7 145,098 88,995 Capital assets Neighbourhood centre, sports 
centre, Commercial property 
New Horizons 11 851,085 861,530 Capital assets Neighbourhood centre 
Commercial property 
East Anglia NELM Development Trust 7 602,038 569,860 Capital assets Commercial property 
Southeast 
 
East Brighton Trust 1 284,456 253,496 Capital assets Commercial property 
Marsh Farm Futures 7 594,640 690,310 Capital assets Neighbourhood centre 
Plus You Ltd 7 235,782 362,752 Capital assets; Service provision Neighbourhood centre 
Southwest 
 
Easton and Lawrence Hill Neighbourhood 
Management 
3 145,501 205,782 Capital assets; Neighbourhood governance; 
Service provision 
Commercial property 
Devonport Regeneration Community Partnership2 0 - - Capital assets Business park, sports centre 
London 
 
Newham NDP 4 84,348 162,075 Neighbourhood governance; Service 
provision 
None  
Creation Trust 6 623,336 654,347 Neighbourhood governance; Service 
provision 
None  
Bridge Renewal Trust 16 491,458 486,530 Capital assets; Service provision Community pharmacy 
The New Cross Gate Trust 10 309,358 300,951 Capital assets; Service provision Commercial property 
 Average  9.85 458,832 519,234 - - 
 
Note:  1. ‘Commercial property’ includes assets such as shops, offices and industrial units. ‘Service provision’ relates to delivering contracted services from various sources, such as local government and the NHS. 
2.  Devonport Regeneration Community Partnership is a registered private mutual society with financial accounts unavailable to the general public.   
 
Source: Author’s survey; Annual accounts registered at Companies House and Charity Commission.  
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